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Two years ago the Pennsylvania Supreme Court weighed in on the matter of how third party standing was consistent with the fundamental right of parents to raise their children. That case moved the ball in a new direction as we had seen a trend favoring third party involvement in child custody litigation where “interest” was shown. On September 21, the Supreme Court issued a decision underscoring the definition of a parent and further articulating who can qualify as in loco parentis.

C.G. was in a same sex relationship with J.H. in Florida when J.H. decided to have a child using intrauterine insemination via anonymous male. The child was born in Florida in 2006. In 2012 J.H. took the child and established a separate residence first in Florida and a few months later in Pennsylvania.

Four years later, C.G. filed an action in Pennsylvania seeking partial custody. This was met with preliminary objections asserting lack of standing. The adult couple never formalized their relationship and no adoption had been begun even though Florida legalized same sex adoption in 2010.

The evidence about the relationship between C.G. and the child born to J.H. was unusual. As one might expect C.G. presented herself and supporting witnesses to promote the idea that she was part of the choice to have the child and a hands-on caregiver from the day delivery. But, once the adult relationship cooled, contact between C.G. and the child was once per week. After J.H. moved with the child to Pennsylvania C.G. saw the child only once in March, 2014 and didn’t phone her too often. C.G.’s financial contributions to the child seemed to be limited to occasional gifts and some camp tuition. C.G. did name the child as a beneficiary of an insurance policy on her life.

The opinion of Justice Sallie Mundy notes that the resolution of the preliminary objections involved testimony from sixteen witnesses and exhibits ranging from school parent forms to thank you notes following J.H.’s baby shower. This evidence was heavy in hope and expectation and remarkably light in terms of actual goods and services associated with parenting. Nonetheless, C.G. asserted that she was a parent under Section 5324(1) or “at the very least” a person in loco parentis. 23 Pa.C.S. 5324(2).

The Trial Court ruled that C.G. lacked standing. The disputed testimony aside, the Court noted no reference to C.G. on the birth certificate; no reference to C.G. in the child’s name and no action to begin a second parent adoption once Florida permitted such proceedings. The life insurance policy and the presence of the child on C.G.’s health insurance until the J.H. relationship ended was all of the documentary evidence the Court could find, and it credited J.H.’s testimony that she was responsible for almost every child-related decision concerning things like medical care, day care and other needs. C.G. did pay her share of household expenses while the two resided together but that appears to have been the extent of contribution aside from health coverage. The court stayed away from “bonding” issues noting that standing is an objective standard where bonding is not. See K.C. v. L.A. 128 A.3d 774,779 (Pa. 2015).

The Superior Court affirmed based on the absence that C.G. showed no law was advanced establishing that a non-biological, non-adoptive former partner can be a parent. C.G. v. J.H. 172 A.3d 43, 51-52 (2017). As for the in loco parentis claim the Superior Court deferred to the trial court findings of fact.

Justice Mundy’s opinion properly begins with the requirement of standing in all cases; “a substantial, direct and immediate interest” in the subject matter. It also noted that in custody matters, the goal is to protect families from intrusions by even well-meaning strangers.

C.G. advanced what is called an “intent based” approach to the role of parent. This Court notes that law does not yet define who is a parent but that the accepted definition is a status conferred by either biology or adoption. It also noted that the recent In re Baby S case also suggests that the status of parent can be expressed or implied by agreement. 128 A.3d 296 (Pa.S. 2015); See also J.F. v. D.B.  897 A.2d  1261 (Pa.Super. 2006). But here, the Plaintiff had none of these requisites. If C.G. was not a party to a parenting agreement or otherwise identified as an intended parent during the conception and birth process, she is not a parent under Pennsylvania law. Pennsylvania does not adopt the Massachusetts approach that allows parentage to be established by professing to be a parent. Interestingly, Justices Wecht, Dougherty and Donohue appear to be more open to this concept although they did not find that C.G. met the “professed parent” standard. The interplay between that view and conduct that is in loco parentis is an interesting topic.

On the claim of standing in loco parentis, the Court noted the twin requirements of “assumption of parental status” and “discharge of parental duties.” C.G. advanced a case, T.B. v. L.R.M. 786 A.2d 916 arising from an agreement to have a child together with one parent choosing the sperm donor and subsequent sharing of all physical responsibilities. The Supremes found T.B. to show a much higher level of involvement with the child than what the trial court observed in this case. It also distinguished C.G.’s claims from those in J.A.L. v. E.P.H. another same sex case with facts similar to T.B. 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1996). In both of those cases there was a documentary trail of medical authorizations, standby guardian documents and the like evincing a desire to raise a child together. This desire was borne out by what occurred in terms of consistent contact after the adult relationship dissolved. The critical issue is what occurs before a separation occurs, but while the Supreme Court notes that post separation conduct should not control a claim to be in loco parentis, that conduct may shed light upon claims of a person to have assumed rights and discharged duties while the relationship was intact. Here the post separation conduct seems reflective of what occurred when C.G. and J. H. were living together but C.G.’s asserted parenting role seemed passive at best.

As I read the analysis in C.G. v. J.H. it became clear that this is an area where we need clear standards, either by statute or rule. The Centre County judge who heard this case listened to 16 witnesses while deciding not a custody placement but “preliminary objections”. One has to wonder why it took C.G. almost four years to assert parental rights. But, she waited almost as long to see whether she was even a real party in interest.

We live in a world where the birth or adoption of every child is documented. When a person claims the role of parent, whether by biology or contract, that person must register such a claim if he or she is not named on the vital statistics form as a condition to assertion of “parentage.” And, shouldn’t someone claiming to be acting in loco parentis be statutorily required to show that their assumptions of duty and discharge of obligations has been continuous and recent as part of a pleading to intervene? We devote lots of ink to the subject of child best interests. Yet, one of those interests should be avoidance of protracted and acrimonious custody litigation. In many instances that cannot be avoided. But, where a child left one state and was relocated to another, only to see the loco parente once in four years, should that child be subjected to the kind of litigation this case involve. He/she was five when C.G. exited from daily existence. That child is now twelve and probably wondering whether custody litigation with a person they can scarcely recall will remain a part of daily life. C.G. v. J.H., 2 M.A.P. 2018 (Sept. 21. 2018)

This was a summer where prenuptials arrived in profusion, and what made it interesting is that just about all of them involved folks who were either beginning or in the middle of their earning careers. Most prenuptials involve couples who already have kids from former marriages and money they want to preserve for those kids. But we also see prenups for young people who have wealth already transmitted from their parents; parents who want that wealth to stay on their child’s side of the column even after a marriage occurs.

When going through this process with young folks or even people who are in their forties, lawyers ask lots of questions that can be uncomfortable. No one ever really asks a couple how they want to live their financial lives together and yet as McKenzie Frankel, a financial planner in Wayne, PA has observed, a lot of relationships would work far better if those questions were addressed. When it comes to how we manage family and money our expectations are often hard baked into our personalities by our own life experiences. Millennials can be especially interesting to work with because many of them are raised to eschew family and money stereotypes (e.g., mothers stay at home and dad’s do the financial stuff).

I read the Money Personality Quiz developed by Frankel and her partner Joslyn Ewart with interest, but I also considered some far more basic questions that young people in love should be asking each other. I also believe that the answers to some of these questions might be worth incorporating into agreements. Permit me to try my hand at my own “personality quiz:”

  • How important is it to your relationship that you have children, with a “0” reflecting no interest in raising a family and “5” indicating that it was indispensable to agreeing to marriage?
  • Indicate the optimum number of children you would want to have with your intended spouse.
  • Indicate the outer limit of the number of children you think you would want to have.
  • If fertility becomes an issue for either of you, would you be prepared to incur the expense and physical challenges which fertility treatments may involve?
  • If fertility is an issue, indicate your receptivity to adoption and whether there are limits to how far you were willing to adjust to the alternative options adoption may require.
  • If you had a child who suffered physical, intellectual or emotional limitations that prevent one of you from being able to work outside the home, how would you decide which of you would make that financial sacrifice and how would that sacrifice be compensated if the marriage were to dissolve?
  • If your child(ren) had no limitations but you decided that one of you did not want to return to work in order to devote energy to full time parenting, how should that be compensated if the marriage were to dissolve? How should you reduce or limit your lifestyle/expenses once the decision is made and the household income is reduced?
  • If you both had jobs earning equal amounts of money and one of you was offered employment that would require relocation to another city, how much more compensation would the spouse offered the job have to receive before you would agree to move, especially if no substitute job was immediately available in the new market.
  • How important is it to you that your child have the benefit of private school when a reasonable public school is available?
  • Do you see it as your responsibility to provide children with either vocational or academic training after they have completed high school? In a day (today) when a four year public school undergrad degree costs $80,000 and a private school $160,000, what should be your contribution and how do you want to finance the parent portion (e.g., savings or when it comes)?
  • In a day when the average social security benefit for a retiree is about $17,000 a year and the maximum benefit, if you contribute the maximum ($8,000 per annum) and defer to age 70, is $44,000 a year, what kind of retirement income do you hope to have and when do you intend to start financing that via savings? Can you agree now that a portion of your earnings go into some form of retirement and that you would continue that percentage?
  • How important is it to you that you own your home rather than rent a dwelling, “0” being of no consequence and “5” being an absolute necessity?
  • If you earned $30,000 per annum what do you consider a reasonable amount for a monthly auto payment excluding any trade in value (i.e., “0” down)? If your income doubled, would your expectations change and by how much?
  • Is there a level of income where you would prefer to devote additional energy to non-income producing endeavors like charitable work, creative work or occupations which sometimes pay lots of money but typically are low on the income ladder (e.g., acting, writing etc.)?
  • Between 1 and 5, rank your future spouse’s financial stability in terms of their approach to money. If your intended could earn $100,000 but would likely spend more than he earned, that’s a low rank. If your spouse would earn $30,000 but be more likely to still have money for savings he/she is more toward a 5.
  • What is your intended spouse’s current credit rating and what does the credit history look like? Shakespeare said it best: Past is prologue. And it’s a delicate subject, but have tax returns for recent years been filed?
  • Hobbies and collectibles are often a tell-tale signs of financial distress. Gambling, sports or clothing addictions and “collections” (whether cars, handbags, guns or memorabilia) can often take even solid wage earners over the edge. The latter expense often masquerades as an “investment.” We have worked with clients who have tried this. Very few profit from their efforts and many owe large sums on what they do own.
  • What’s the child support situation? Don’t be surprised to find out that a prospective mate who otherwise seems an honorable person owes tens of thousands in back support. There can be many explanations for this and some may be more reflective of neglect than malice but it won’t make any difference, when the $10,000 bonus you deposited to the joint bank account for a trip to Orlando is seized to pay his past due support.
  • Criminal background. This can be a painful look but today Pennsylvania has data online about prior criminal history. It does not include juvenile offenses (which occur before age 18), but any adult bad behavior tends to linger. Make certain you are looking at the right name and verify if possible with a birthdate and/or a social security number. You may be planning a driving honeymoon while your future bride is juggling her second DUI arrest.

So there are two stories here. Know the past of the person you love and talk about the future and how to address it. And while you are discussing the future you may want to think about an agreement that protects you with some promises that could be legally enforceable.

When you marry you usually take on obligations of support for each other. The property you acquire (except by gift) is divisible in divorce. The debt is as well. Most people file joint tax returns which means that any monkey business with the return affects both monkeys even though only one monkey was cooking the books. And except for credit card debt, lots of consumer debt including mortgages are “joint and several.” That’s legalese for “you’re on the hook for the mortgage even though you consistently gave him cash to make the payment.” He just had other priorities.

The author has plenty of real life stories to back up the scary things he just described. What makes the stories tragic is that they were actually avoidable if someone had asked some of the questions before. We have all heard the stories about people online creating an avatar; an identity that does not reflect who they really are. Don’t allow a love-based fantasy to ruin your otherwise stable reality.

In February 2018 we wrote about a recent New York appellate case making clear that those who post information about themselves on Facebook are going to have a difficult time asserting that the posting is private and not subject to scrutiny in subsequent judicial proceedings. This is especially true where the content of the posting can be tied to the litigation. In that case, a Facebook posting was found to be discoverable in a personal injury case.

That was New York in February and the law of New York does not necessarily apply in its sister state of Pennsylvania.  But, just as the highest court in New York was grappling with Facebook postings, a trial court judge in Monroe County, Pennsylvania (think Poconos) was deciding a very similar kind of case.

Kelter v. Flanagan is a personal injury case arising out of an auto collision.  In pre-trial discovery, the defendant made a demand upon the Plaintiff to preserve and produce communications the plaintiff had on Instagram after the collision occurred.

In a deposition, the plaintiff professed not to have social media accounts.  The defendant’s counsel was instantly able to show that fact to be untrue as the attorney possessed postings published by plaintiff on a public Instagram account.  Instagram has both public and private access options.  When the defendant pressed for access to private messages, the plaintiff sought protection from that stating that she had produced all of her public access messages.  Alas, the court found that Instagram allows its customers to toggle between public and private and that one cannot use a change of account status as a defense to production of this information.

The defendant’s goal in this case is to secure evidence of activities which belie the claim of injury or mitigate the extent of it. As Judge David Williamson aptly notes, pre-trial discovery is intended to allow the parties to explore any evidence that makes the existence of a fact more or less probable.   Pa. Rule of Evidence 401.  Communication on any social media platform is a statement, and, if that statement helps a court to assess what caused an event or what impact the event had upon the person experiencing it, chances are strong that claims of privacy will yield to a judicially sponsored search for truth.

In this case, the remedy was quite broad.  The Plaintiff was directed to provide her log-in information.  Lord knows, what will be behind that door.  Under the rules of evidence only relevant facts are to be brought to the courtroom, but under this ruling the counsel for the defendant may get to see a lot of personal material the plaintiff never dreamed would be available to strangers.  Attorneys viewing these communications could themselves be liable for unnecessary publication of private information in an invasion of privacy action if they circulated embarrassing data not directly relevant to the case.  But, no doubt, rulings like this may produce some scandalous material and some testy arguments over whether embarrassing information is relevant to the action before the court.

This is a personal injury case, but the ruling, while not precedential, has merit in a family law setting as well.  So beware of what you write or post because unlike oral communication, Instagram might be forever, or just long enough to expose you.